



Afghanistan

Policy Brief

September 15, 2003



Good Intentions Will Not Pave The Road to Peace

The Afghan people have been promised a lot in the last two years. New rules for a new world would be written in their country. Regime change would deliver Afghans, finally, from oppression and violence, while a Marshall Plan would give them a chance to rebuild their lives.¹

Almost two years later, they are still waiting. Much of the country remains a tinderbox, with reconstruction all but stalled, and ordinary Afghans wondering if reality will ever match the rhetoric.

In recent months, as regime change in Iraq has proven increasingly challenging, Afghanistan is getting more attention, in word if not in deed. More than twenty months since the Bonn Agreement proposed the expansion of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) beyond Kabul, it still has not happened. Despite constant requests from the Afghan government for more reconstruction funds, and

months of positive “signals” on funding from the United States and Europe, sufficient funds have yet to flow to reconstruction projects in Afghanistan.

Hopes for peace will not stand still in Afghanistan. They will either grow stronger with urgent attention or they will dissipate if the international community does not act now. To date, insufficient resources and international attention have been dedicated to security and reconstruction, and each remains dependent on the other. Without greater security, reconstruction will remain stalled. Without reconstruction, insecurity will continue to thrive.

Putting Afghanistan on the road to peace needs more than good intentions, it needs urgent action. If donors continue to try to fulfil their pledges on the cheap or allow for further delays, they will set Afghanistan on a road to hell that Afghans know too well.

Findings

1. Since September 2002, armed attacks against the assistance community have gone from one a month to 1 every 2 days (on average). It is becoming very difficult to do reconstruction work in many areas of the country.
2. From June-August 2002, the ratio of armed attacks outside Kabul to inside the city was approximately 2:1. This year in the same period, the ratio was 7:1. Meanwhile, ISAF soldiers remain restricted to Kabul, while there is one PRT soldier for every 100,000 Afghans outside of Kabul.
3. To date, donors have given Afghanistan less than half of its annual reconstruction need. Going forward, they have pledged less than 25% of what Afghanistan really needs in reconstruction aid over the next four years.
4. After 18 months, less than 1% of reconstruction needs have been met.

Recommendations

1. The international community should acknowledge the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan and articulate the immediate steps it will take to address extremist militancy, warlordism and narco-criminality.
2. NATO should fulfil the original ISAF mandate in the Bonn Agreement by overseeing the withdrawal of factional forces from Kabul and agree to expand ISAF in sufficient numbers to key locations outside of Kabul before the end of 2003.
3. Donors should commit now to provide at least \$20 billion to Afghanistan’s reconstruction over the next four years.
4. Donors must pay more now in support for security and reconstruction, if Afghanistan is to become a self-policing, self-governing state with a legitimate, growing economy in four years time.

The Bell Tolls

For more than a year, CARE, the Center on International Cooperation (CIC) and many others have urged the international community to wake up to Afghanistan's deteriorating security environment. With no peacekeepers outside of Kabul, and an Afghan security force years away from full preparedness, it is little surprise that Afghanistan is becoming an increasingly dangerous place, and reconstruction is slowing down.

Many areas of the country are now off limits to the aid community. Half of Afghanistan's 32 provinces had areas deemed high risk for aid work in September 2003.¹ Three more provinces had medium risk areas.² Five others saw factional fighting or tensions in August 2003.³ As the number of attacks against the UN and NGOs increased over the last year (see Figure 1),⁴ Afghanistan's hopes of reconstruction grew increasingly fragile.

Afghanistan's security is threatened by (1) militants dedicated to regime overthrow, (2) Afghan warlords and (3) narco-criminality. Individually, these are each serious threats. Together, their danger is compounded.

Extremist militancy:⁵ Despite concerted international effort since January 2002, terrorist threats persist from Al Qaida, neo-Taliban forces and their militant allies. Afghans claim that this threat is magnified by the lack of an adequate border security force,⁶ enabling interference by anti-western militants in neighboring states, who are enraged at the prospect of a strong and cohesive pro-western Afghanistan.⁷ International efforts to build an effective border police must move from rhetoric to reality with urgency, while more must be done to ensure that southern Pashtuns are not further alienated by upcoming political processes such as the Constitutional Loya Jirga and the national elections, slated for June 2004.

The Warlord Problem: Warlords continue to control armies that dwarf Afghanistan's national security forces in size.⁸ Since 2001, when the US funded and rearmed them to garner their support for Operation Enduring Freedom, they have grown militarily stronger and richer (from Coalition payments,⁹ illegal taxes¹⁰ and growing opium revenues¹¹). These warlords do not want regime overthrow—they have everything to gain from a weak national security structure, and a government straightjacketed by a lack of funding and capacity.¹² Until these forces are absorbed or demobilized, they will threaten Afghanistan's security. Warlord power will endure as long as two key objectives of US foreign policy (the war against terror and the establishment of a strong central government) work at cross-purposes. By supporting warlords to achieve the former objective, the US may be undermining the latter objective. It is critical for the US to find a way to defeat extremism in Afghanistan that also limits the power of Afghanistan's private militia leaders.

Narco-criminality: With a weak national security structure and limited rule of law, reconstruction stalling, and extreme poverty everywhere, no wonder organized crime is growing. The most telling indicator is poppy cultivation. In 2003, areas under poppy cultivation are expected to increase in 83 different districts, and decrease in less than 20 districts (see Figure 2).¹⁴ Afghanistan's share of global opium production went from 12% in 2001¹³ to 76% in 2002, when the country produced more than 3,400 tons of opium. As the international community has done little to curtail growing narco-criminality, the drug economy has become more entrenched. Urgent action must be taken to limit the growing power of narco-criminals in Afghanistan.

Figure 1: Attacks Against the Assistance Community





Figure 2: Trends in Areas Under Poppy Cultivation in 2003 (by district)



Finding: Since September 2002, armed attacks against the assistance community have gone from one a month to one every two days (on average). It is becoming very difficult to do reconstruction work in many areas of the country.

Recommendation: The international community should acknowledge the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan, and articulate the immediate steps it will take to address extremist militancy, warlordism and narco-criminality.

Talk and Talk of Peace- keepers

In 2002, international policy makers openly resisted expanding ISAF beyond Kabul. No one wanted to put their soldiers in harm's way or to foot the bill.¹ Today, NATO and the United States are talking about ISAF expansion.² But that is *all* they are doing—talking. Meanwhile Afghanistan's hopes for reconstruction are catching fire, in all the wrong ways. While Kabul remains relatively (but not entirely) secure,³ the same cannot be said for most of Afghanistan, particularly recently. See Figure 3.⁴

North American and European policy makers cite security risks and economic cost as constraints on ISAF expansion. Yet, there is a range of cost-effective options for expansion that have not been fully discussed. The Henry Stimson Center, for example, argues that an 18,000-strong force could provide border security, protect roads, and actively deter or suppress inter-militia fighting, while costing about \$1.6 billion per year over two years, less than 1/6th the cost of Operation Enduring Freedom in 2002.⁵

On August 11, NATO took over command of ISAF, significantly increasing the military and financial resources potentially available for expansion, and creating greater continuity in command. Despite the Bonn Agreement's (2001) explicit contemplation of such expansion, despite the pleas of 90 international assistance organizations working in Afghanistan,⁷ and despite the urgent need to fill the security vacuum outside of Kabul, NATO has, to date, yet to expand ISAF. The recent German/US request to NATO members for expansion is a positive step, but it is time to move from good intentions to action. It is simply not right that while Kosovo, Bosnia, Croatia and East Timor had an average of one peacekeeper for every 65 people, Afghanistan still has only one ISAF member for every 5,380 people.⁸

Instead of ISAF expansion, international policy makers point to "Provincial Reconstruction Teams" (PRTs) as the "best thing that can be done to ultimately provide security" in Afghanistan (says Secretary Rumsfeld).⁹ Certainly, PRTs have potential to improve security. These teams of 40-100 military and civilian personnel¹⁰ have good access to local power brokers and militia leaders and are perceived (though perhaps wrongly) to have military muscle. Many Afghans no doubt believe that, as part of the Coalition, the PRTs will provide them with security.

Yet even the US military concedes that the PRT role is not to keep peace, protect civilians, disarm militias, or intervene militarily between fighting militias. They don't have the resources or military personnel. Their mandate is restricted to intelligence gathering, negotiation, small reconstruction projects, and other forms of "winning hearts and minds" for the central government and the Coalition.¹¹

Since the PRTs' conception, CARE, CIC and others have urged them to expand their focus on security and engage less in direct reconstruction,¹² which unnecessarily and dangerously blurs the line between the military and civilians and is designed for short term visibility, not long-term impact. If they do focus on security, PRTs may not be a bad idea, and news of more PRTs should be welcomed (there may be many as sixteen).¹³ But unless they are significantly scaled up in size and mandate, they should not be portrayed as an adequate or even "second-best" alternative to a serious investment in peacekeeping.¹⁴ Claiming that PRT deployments leave Afghanistan's security glass half full is not just overly optimistic. It is dangerously misleading.

Figure 3: Armed Attacks, June 02-August 03





Figure 4: PRT's Operational Areas



Four PRTs are currently operational in Gardez, Kunduz, Bamyan and Mazar (red dots). Four more are planned for Herat, Parwan, Jalalabad and Kandahar (yellow dots). Even if all 8 are running by the end of 2003, there will still be only 1 PRT member for every 50,000 Afghans, and the PRTs will be 10% the size of Kabul's ISAF force.⁶

Finding: From June-August 2002, the ratio of armed attacks outside Kabul to inside the city was approximately 2:1. This year in the same period, the ratio was 7:1. Meanwhile, ISAF soldiers remain restricted to Kabul, with one PRT soldier for every 100,000 Afghans outside of Kabul.

Recommendation: NATO should fulfil the original ISAF mandate in the Bonn Agreement by overseeing the withdrawal of faction forces from Kabul and agreeing to expand ISAF to key locations outside of Kabul before the end of 2003.

Mind the Gap

A series of trends have combined to raise the costs of reconstruction in Afghanistan. Insecurity has not only slowed reconstruction down, but significantly inflated costs.¹ Unforeseen levels of refugee return,² drought in 2002, and logistical and communications challenges have also made costs spiral upwards. At the Tokyo 2002 conference, donors pledged \$4.5 billion in reconstruction funding over five years.³ Even then, the World Bank thought it would take twice that much—\$10.2 billion.⁴ Today, the Afghan government

believes it might take as much as \$30 billion. How much is enough? There are different ways to assess Afghanistan's reconstruction needs, but all lead to the same conclusion—there is a huge gap between what is needed and has been promised and delivered:

- In four other recent post-conflict settings (Rwanda, East Timor, Kosovo and Bosnia), donors spent an average of \$250 per person per year in aid. By that measure, Afghanistan should get \$5.5 billion per year in reconstruction aid over the next four years.⁵
- Afghanistan's Ministry of Finance believes that \$30 billion over the next five years is required to move beyond a failed development model.⁶ By that calculation, Afghanistan should receive \$6 billion a year.
- The populations of Iraq and Afghanistan are roughly equal, while needs are greater and natural resources fewer in Afghanistan. Yet, when the US recently committed an additional \$20 billion for Iraq for *this year*, Afghanistan was promised only \$800 million, (less than 1% of President Bush's recent request to Congress).⁷


Ironically, when President Bush requested these funds, the United States became Afghanistan's most generous donor this year. Afghanistan is getting the short end of the donor stick. From January 2002 to March 2004, all donors combined will have contributed or pledged an average of \$2.1 billion a year—about 10% of that pledged for Iraq, and less than half of the \$5 billion that should be a conservative annual minimum for Afghanistan (see Table 1).¹¹

Table 1: Most Committed Donors⁸

Donor	Spent 1/02-3/03	Pledges 4/03-3/04	Total for 2 years
1. USA ⁹	370	1,100	1,470
2. EU ¹⁰	534	761	1,295
3. Japan	358	142	500
4. Canada	83	83	166
5. World Bank	23	80	103
6. Norway	40	53	93
7. Iran	33	55	88
8. Saudi Arabia	27	49	76
9. India	32	40	72
10. China	30	30	60
10. Russia	30	30	60
Total	1,560	2,423	3,983

Totaling more than 95% of overall pledges

Figure 5: Pledges from 2003-2007



Looking to the future, the figures are even more worrying.

With needs for the next four years estimated to be *at least* \$20 billion and probably more, combined pledges from March 03–March 07 are only \$4,847 billion or less than 25% of that figure.

The figures on pledges speak for themselves (Figure 5): the international community is still unwilling to commit adequate resources *now* to setting Afghanistan on the road to recovery. What Afghanistan needs is a sustained commitment by donors to provide funding over a period of years. As CARE has shown in previous policy briefs, aid support for Afghanistan should go up, not down over time, as absorptive capacity increases and the Afghan economy kicks into gear.¹²

Finding: To date, donors have given Afghanistan less than half of its annual reconstruction need. Going forward, they have pledged less than 25% of what Afghanistan really needs in reconstruction aid over the next four years.

Recommendation: Donors should commit now to provide at least \$20 billion to Afghanistan's reconstruction over the next four years.

Pay Now or Pay Later

The gap between needs and pledges is one concern, but the gap between promised support and actual reconstruction is more troubling. As Figure 6 shows,¹ only a tiny fraction of pledged funding had resulted in completed reconstruction projects by May 2003. Critical leakage has occurred in three areas:

- Of funding that has been paid already or promised in the future by donors, less than a third has actually been disbursed.
- More than 20% of the money disbursed has been diverted to meet short-term emergency needs.
- Due to insecurity and delays by donors and implementers, only projects worth \$192 million were completed by mid-May 2003. In other words, roughly 1% of Afghanistan's reconstruction needs have been met after 18 months.

Blame for delays cannot be placed on the slowness of the Afghan government. Despite repeated requests by the Afghan government to give it the financial authority to lead the reconstruction process, donors refused. The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund received about 5% of its budget request this year, and that funded only current expenditures of the government, mostly salaries.² Arguments for the government's weak absorptive capacity are undermined by donor refusal to invest adequately in building that capacity or to allow the government to learn how to manage its resources.

Delays in current reconstruction cannot be easily redressed in years to come. The longer Afghans are made to wait for visible signs of support from their government or the international community, the easier it will be for extremists to exploit their resentment, and for criminals to profit from the institutional vacuum that results.

As CIC and the Ministry of Finance have noted,³ the international community can go one of three ways:

- Support the urgent deployment of peacekeepers to key locations around the country and ensure adequate reconstruction resources are invested to reduce Afghanistan's dependence on aid, helping to build a secure, self-policing, self-governing state with a legitimate growing economy. **Cost: \$6.6 billion a year for 4 years.**
- Maintain peacekeepers in Kabul only, and continue to fund reconstruction at current levels, transforming Afghanistan from an immediate threat to a dependent ward of the international community. **Cost: \$2.5 billion a year indefinitely.**
- Withdraw peacekeepers and lower current funding levels allowing Afghanistan to descend into warlordism and narco-criminality, increasing the likelihood of home grown extremism and support for terrorism. **Cost: Incalculable.**

In a world where stability and prosperity are global issues, the international community will surely pay for its actions in Afghanistan, sooner or later—either by supporting Afghanistan now, or by paying for the consequences of not doing so later.

Figure 6: From Real Need to Completed Projects





Figure 7: Three Choices



Finding: After 18 months, approximately 1% of reconstruction needs have been met.

Recommendation: Donors must pay more now in support for security and reconstruction, if Afghanistan is to become a self-policing, self-governing state with a legitimate growing economy in four years' time.

The Road to Hell?


The inconsistent fulfilment of commitments to Afghanistan is evident in the road reconstruction story. Promises have been plentiful, but progress has been slow. Afghanistan cannot rebuild itself on roads paved with good intentions.

Responding to repeated pleas from President Karzai, various donors promised to repair the primary road network. In 2002, the U.S., Saudi Arabia, and Japan promised Karzai they would repair the Kabul-Kandahar road. President Bush wanted the American commitment fulfilled in 2003.

When logistical problems and insecurity threatened that deadline, US policy makers decided to bring in contractors to lay a temporary 4-inch surface on the road this year, and return to put on a sustainable surface at a later date. When this plan ran into difficulties due to insecurity, a security force (700-strong) was brought in to protect the contractors. Attacks on road workers have continued into September nonetheless.¹ Delays continue. If the temporary surface is completed this year, and that is far from certain, it will mean that in two years since the fall of the Taliban, about 10% of Afghanistan's major road network will be repaved with a temporary surface.

No one disputes that Afghans must ultimately meet their own security and reconstruction needs. There is also consensus that it will be at least four years before the Afghan state will have the resources or policing capacity to take on those two functions. The international community has an opportunity to help Afghanistan become a self-governing, self-policing state with a growing legal economy. But, it must act now, and with greater deliberation and resources than it has shown thus far.

Figure 8: Progress on Road Construction



*Sporadic work has begun on different feeders. None are complete.

Endnotes

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¹ Promise makers included Tony Blair, (“To the Afghan people we make this commitment. The conflict will not be the end. We will not walk away, as the outside world has done so many times before”. October 2, 2001); George W. Bush, (“We will work to help Afghanistan to develop an economy that can feed its people. We are working in the best traditions of George Marshall. Marshall knew that our military victory in World War II had to be followed by a moral victory that resulted in better lives for individual human beings.” April 17, 2002) and Chris Patten, Commissioner for External Relations in the European Commission (“I am determined to ensure that the European Community remains fully engaged in Afghanistan even if world attention shifts to other places of conflict and post-conflict rehabilitation”, September 5, 2002).

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¹ Provinces with high-risk areas include Balkh, Farah, Ghazni, Helmand, Kandahar, Khost, Kunar, Logar, Nangarhar, Nimroz, Nuristan Paktika, Paktya, Uruzgan, Wardak, and Zabul. Sources are drawn from Afghanistan Non-governmental Security Office (“ANSO”) and UN security briefings and documents published in Kabul in August and September 2003.

² Bamyán, Ghor, and Laghman.

³ Jawzjan, Faryab, Samangan, Sari Pul, and Takhar. Only Badakshan, Baghdis, Baghlan, Herat, Kabul, Kapisa, Kunduz, and Parwan were deemed low risk with no factional fighting or tension.

⁴ The data for Sep 2002-Feb 2003 is drawn from the Stimson Center (see citation below). Post-Feb 2003 data is drawn from the weekly security situation summaries of ANSO, and includes all attacks against the UN and NGOs where there was armed confrontation. It does not include burglaries, corruption or other non-violent incidents. ANSO probably has the largest transparent network of partners sharing security information in Afghanistan, and provides an invaluable service to the NGO community, as we cannot get such information elsewhere. ANSO checks its data and reports strong confidence in its accuracy.

⁵ “Neo-Taliban” is a term increasingly used in Afghanistan to describe militants claiming affiliation to the former Taliban movement still engaged in or actively supportive of hostilities with Coalition Forces, and includes a number of groups who claim now to be fighting with the Taliban.

⁶ In June of this year when there should have been more than 2,000 border police trained, the Stimson Center reported that

training had not even begun. See www.stimson.org.

⁷ See generally, Barnett R. Rubin and Andrea Armstrong, *Regional Issues in the Reconstruction of Afghanistan*, World Policy Journal, Spring 2003, pp. 31-40. On July 8, 2003, Afghan rioters destroyed the Pakistan embassy in Kabul, protesting recent incursions by Pakistan’s military and their efforts to redraw contiguous borders.

⁸ The Afghan National Army remains less than 10,000 strong. Meanwhile a half dozen militia leaders each command larger forces than that. See generally Mark Sedra, *Challenging the Warlord Culture: Security Sector Reform in Post-Taliban Afghanistan* (2002).

⁹ At the outset of OEF, the CIA handed over millions to warlords to buy their allegiance. See Bob Woodward, *Bush at War* (2002) at pages 143, 155. That relationship survived the battle with the Taliban. See also, *General Values Alliance With Afghan Warlords*, Los Angeles Times November 4, 2002 where General MacNeill concedes that the US still pays the warlords who helped them win the war.

¹⁰ The government expects that of \$700 million in customs duties that will be levied in Afghanistan this year, it expects more than \$500 million to stay, illegally, with regional warlords. Interview with Ministry of Finance officials.

¹¹ One year after the Taliban’s defeat—in 2002, Afghanistan’s share of global opium production rose to 75%. Where opium was grown in areas under a militia control, drug related financial support bought off those militias.

¹² Less than 20% of aid has gone through channels controlled by government. See CARE Policy Brief *Rebuilding Afghanistan, A Little Less Talk, A Lot More Action*, October 1, 2002, and *Minister of Finance interviewed on Talk of the Nation*, National Public Radio, April 9, 2003.

¹³ This drop in Afghanistan’s share was due to a concerted Taliban clamp down on poppy production. Some believe the Taliban’s aim was to stock pile opium and drive up prices. This is an unlikely explanation for the full drop however, as the area under production also vastly decreased in 2001.

¹⁴ Sources on drug cultivation are drawn from analysis by the Henry L. Simson Center (at www.stimson.org), and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, *Opium Assessment* in May 2003.

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¹ See quotes from European policy makers in CARE Policy Brief, *A New Year’s Resolution To Keep: Secure A Lasting Peace in Afghanistan* (January 2003).

² See comments of George Robinson (NATO Secretary General) on September 9, 2003 and Donald Rumsfeld at www.usembassy.de/policy/foreign.htm, (Sep 8, 2003).

³ Yet, ISAF’s performance in Kabul has been far from satisfactory. Like their Coalition counterparts, they have not taken on the thorny issue of private militias. ISAF’s original mandate was to rid Kabul of factional forces, yet it has refused to engage on this issue. For a frightening analysis of how Kabul’s police are still run by faction leaders see Amnesty International, *Afghanistan: Police Reconstruction Essential For The Protection Of Human Rights*, March 2003.

⁴ The underlying data was put together by William Durch, Geoffrey Brown and Carl Robichaud of the Stimson Center (wdurch@stimson.org). Using public sources such as the media wires, relief web and British Agency Afghan Group, the data includes “attacks” on civilian or military targets affiliated with the coalition or the political and economic recovery efforts taking place under the umbrella of the Bonn Process. The table does not tabulate raids conducted by Coalition or Afghan forces. Each attack is counted only once, coded according to the heaviest weapon used.

⁵ William J. Durch, *Peace and Stability Operations in Afghanistan: Requirements and Force Options*, June 28, 2003 at www.stimson.org. It is also worth noting that the international community put 25 times more money and 50 times more troops on a per capita basis into post-conflict Kosovo than into post-conflict Afghanistan. As the Rand Corporation notes “These higher levels of input account in significant measure for the higher levels of output in terms of democratic institution building and economic growth.” See <http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/summer2003/nation3.html>.

⁶ The US currently runs the Bamyán, Kunduz and Gardez PRTs, with the British running Mazar. Figures and information taken from discussions with Coalition and United Nations representatives.

⁷ See statement by NGOs at www.theirc.org (updated August 2003).

⁸ See CARE Policy Brief, *A New Year’s Resolution To Keep: Secure A Lasting Peace in Afghanistan* at 5, January 2003.

⁹ US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, *Press Briefing*, April 26, 2003. (website: usinfo.state.gov).

¹⁰ Because of varied Afghan contexts and the lack of a written template for PRTs, each team is constituted differently, but most are made up largely of civil affairs, political and aid officers and are protected by infantry soldiers.

¹¹ This year, the funding available for reconstruction by US-led PRTs (known as ODHACA funds and drawn from DOD money) was \$12 million dollars—less than 0.1% of Afghanistan’s reconstruction needs.

¹² Beginning in January 2002, CARE has called for PRT modification to US policy makers in the Departments of Defense and

State in Washington, as well as the US military, the US embassy in Kabul, and through more than two dozen international media stories. Contact pobrien@care.org for more details.

¹³ See Ahmed Rashid's article outlining key elements of new US policy in Far Eastern Economic Review, July 31, 2003.

¹⁴ As was implied to Rashid, see note above.

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¹ Major reconstruction projects require additional security—a 700-strong force has been hired to protect the Kabul-Kandahar road. Insecurity also causes endless delays, increases access problems, makes assessments, travel and extraction more difficult, as well limits the kinds of projects you can do. All of these factors inflate costs.

² The World Bank's Preliminary Assessment estimated that 800,000 Afghanis might return in 2002. More than double that figure came back.

³ AACA Database at www.af/dad.

⁴ World Bank Preliminary Assessment (January 2002).

⁵ The estimate for Afghanistan was based on a constant population of 25 million. With this year's influx of 2 million refugees and population expected to grow to 35 million in 10 years (see World Bank 2002 at 27), the actual level of per capita aid will almost certainly be lower. Rwanda data from http://www.um.dk/danida/evalueringsrapporter/1997_rwanda/b3/book3.asp. Bosnia data from <http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/extme/pr052099a.htm> and <http://www.oecd.org/gif/M00001000/M00001474.gif>. East Timor data from <http://www.atimes.com/se-asia/AL18Ae02.html> in 2001 (before Tokyo).

⁶ In preparation for the September 2003, donor-pledging conference in Dubai The MOF reworked its estimates of need. Going back to the original World Bank Needs Assessment from January 2002, they found that many needs were vastly underestimated,

and paid little heed to the additional costs of reconstruction that would be incurred due to heightened insecurity, poor communications and logistics etc. For instance, the Kabul-Kandahar road was costed at \$35 million. In fact it will take in excess of \$300 million.

⁷ Of the \$87 billion requested by President Bush, the remaining \$66 billion went to the military, and \$20 billion went to Iraq's reconstruction. See New York Times, 78% of Bush's Post War Spending is for military.

⁸ Figures are drawn from the AACA database, last updated on July 26, 2003. While some donors may claim discrepancies, the AACA have gone to considerable lengths to ask donors to send figures, and have not always got responses.

⁹ The US figure includes the additional pledge of \$1 billion mentioned in 2003. As the additional funds are not expected to be released before October 1, and will be spent over the next US fiscal year (by Sep 30, 2004) it is assumed that \$500 billion is pledged to be spent in the current Afghan fiscal year (March 2003-March 2004).

¹⁰ Combines spending by the European Commission and by member states, a more useful figure as the EU is approximately the same size economy as the US.

¹¹ This figure is calculated based on the government's donor database, augmented by an additional \$500 million of US support that will be spent in the next six months.

¹² See CARE Policy Brief *Rebuilding Afghanistan, A Little Less Talk, A Lot More Action, October 1, 2002*, at 6 (www.care.org).

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¹ The estimate of minimum need is drawn from our analysis on page 6. Paid or pledged figures come from the government's database at <http://www.afghanistangov.org/dad/quick/index.html>. For the remaining figures and underlying analysis, updated as of May 2003, see Barnett R. Rubin, Humayun Hamidzada, and Abby Stoddard, *Through the Fog of Peace Building: Evaluating the Recon-*

struction of Afghanistan (2 page summary at http://www.cic.nyu.edu/conflict/conflict_project4.html). See Rubin et al (June 19, 2003).

² \$600 million was requested for the ARTF. It received about \$30 million. No money was deposited in the ARTF investment window. In other words, the Afghan government was given no discretionary funding to manage its development budget, and a huge opportunity to build the capacity and fiscal responsibility of the government was lost.

³ For a deeper analysis of these three options, Barnett R. Rubin, Humayun Hamidzada, and Abby Stoddard, *Through the Fog of Peace Building: Evaluating the Reconstruction of Afghanistan*, Presentation to the US House Committee on International Relations, June 19, 2003.

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¹ See IRIN, *Attack on Road Construction Team Kills Six*, September 2, 2003.

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